

Paris as seen from Pere-la-Chaise
TRANSLATED BY EDMUND VON MACH, PH.D.[The complete victory which Russia had won in the Turkish war hadgreatly disturbed the European powers, and in Germany muchapprehension was felt for the safety of Austria. England, too, wasmuch concerned, for she had been displeased at Bismarck's refusal tointervene in the war. German public opinion was aroused, and therepresentative von Bennigsen joined with four colleagues in thefollowing interpellation, which they made in the Reichstag on February8: "Is the Chancellor willing to inform the Reichstag of the politicalsituation in the Orient, and of the position which the German empirehas taken or intends to take in regard to it?" The interpellation wasput on the calendar of February 19, and while Bismarck regarded it asill timed he was ready to reply, lest his silence be misunderstood.] 
Anton von Werner: "The Berlin Congress, 1878"
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BISMARCK AS THE "HONEST BROKER" February 19, 1878
I first ask the indulgence of the Reichstag if I should not be able tostand while I say everything I have to say. I am not so well as Ilook./ With regard to the question, I cannot deny that I was in doubt, when Ifirst saw the interpellation, not whether I would answer it--for itsform gives me the right to answer it with a "No"--but whether I shouldnot have to say "No." Do not assume, gentlemen, as one generally doesin such cases, that the reason was because I had to suppress a gooddeal which would compromise our policy or restrict it in anundesirable manner. On the contrary, I have hardly enough to say inaddition to what is already generally known to induce me, of my owninitiative, to make a statement to the representatives of the empire./ The discussions in the English parliament have almost exhaustivelyanswered one part of the question "What is the politicalsituation in the Orient at the present time?" If, in spite of thepaucity of the information with which I am addressing you, I do notsay "No" it is because I fear the inference that I have much tosuppress, and because such an inference is always disquieting,especially when it is coupled with the desire to make capital out ofmy silence./
I am the more pleased to address you with completefrankness, because the interpellation and the way it was introducedhave given me the impression that if the German policy wishes tocorrespond to the majority opinion of the Reichstag--in so far as Imay consider the recent comments an expression of this opinion--it has only to continue along the path which it has thus far followed./ Regarding the present situation, I suspect that you already knoweverything I can say about it. You know from the press and the Englishparliamentary debates that at present one can say in the Orient, "Thearms are idle, and the storms of war are hushed"--God grant, for along while! The armistice which has been concluded grants the Russianarmy an unbroken position from the Danube to the sea of Marmora, witha base which it lacked formerly. /
I mean the fortresses near the Danube. This fact, which is nowhere denied, seems to me to be the most important of the whole armistice. There is excluded from the Russian occupation, if I begin in the north,a quadrangular piece, with Varna and Shumla, extending along the shore of the Black Sea to Battshila in the north, and not quite to the Bay of Burgas in the south, thence inland to about Rasgrad--a pretty
exact quadrangle. Constantinople and the peninsula of Gallipoli arealso excluded, the very two points on whose independence of Russiaseveral interested powers are laying much stress./ Certain peace preliminaries preceded the armistice, which at the riskof telling you things you already know I shall nevertheless reviewbecause they will answer the question whether German interests are at stake in any one of them. There is, in the first place, theestablishment of Bulgaria "within the limits determined by themajority of the Bulgarian population, and not smaller than indicatedby the conference of Constantinople."/ The difference between these two designations is not of sufficientimportance, I believe, to constitute a reasonable danger to the peaceof Europe. The ethnographical information which we possess is, it istrue, not authentic nor without gaps, and the best we know has beensupplied by Germans in the maps by Kiepert. According to this thenational frontier--the frontier of the Bulgarian nationality--runsdown in the west just beyond Salonica, along a line where the racesare rather unmixed, and in the east with an increased admixture ofTurkish elements in the direction of the Black Sea. /
The frontier of the conference, on the other hand, so far as it is possible to trace it, runs--beginning at the sea--considerably farther north than thenational frontier, and two separate Bulgarian provinces arecontemplated. In the west it reaches somewhat farther than thenational frontier into the districts which have an admixture ofAlbanian races. /
The constitution of Bulgaria according to the preliminaries would be similar to that of Serbia before the evacuation of Belgrade andother strongholds; for this first paragraph of the preliminaries closes with these words, "The Ottoman army will not remain there," and, in parenthesis, "barring a few places subject to mutual agreement."/ It will, therefore, devolve upon the powers who signed the Paristreaty of 1856 to discuss and define those sentences which were leftopen and indefinite there, and to come to an agreement with Russia, ifthis is possible, as I hope it may be./ Then there follow "The Independence of Montenegro * * * also ofRomania and Serbia;" and directions concerning Bosnia andHerzegovina, whose reforms "should be analogous."/ None of these things, I am convinced, touches the interests of Germanyto such an extent that we should be justified in jeopardizing forits sake our relations with our neighbors--our friends. We may acceptone or the other definition without loss in our spheres of interest./ Then there follows, under paragraph five, a stipulation concerning theindemnity of war, which leaves the question open, whether "it shouldbe pecuniary or territorial." This is a matter which concerns thebelligerents in so far as it may be pecuniary, and the signers of theParis treaty of peace in so far as it may be territorial, and willhave to be settled by their consent./ Then there follows the provision concerning the Dardanelles. This, Ibelieve, has given cause for much more anxiety in the world than isjustified by the actual possibilities of any probable outcome. "HisMajesty the Sultan declares his willingness to come to an agreementwith His Majesty the Emperor of Russia with a view of safeguarding therights and interests of Russia in the straits of the Bosporus and theDardanelles."/ The question of the Dardanelles is freighted with importance when itmeans placing the control there--the key of the Bosporus--in otherhands than heretofore, and deciding whether Russia shall be able toclose and to open the Dardanelles at will. All other stipulations canhave reference only to times of peace, for in the more important timesof war the question will always hinge on whether the possessor of thekey to the Dardanelles is in alliance with or dependent on thoseliving outside or inside the Dardanelles, on Russia or on theopponents of Russia. /
In case of war, I believe no stipulation which may be made will have the importance which people fear, provided the Dardanellesare in times of peace in the possession of people who arefully independent of Russia. /
It may be of interest for the people on the shores of the Mediterranean toknow whether the Russian Black Sea fleet shall be permitted in times ofpeace to sail through the Dardanelles and to show itself on their shores. If, however, it shows itself there, I should infer Peace, like good weather from the barometer; when it withdraws and carefully secludes itself, then itis time to suspect that clouds are gathering. The question, therefore,whether men-of-war shall be permitted to pass the Dardanelles in timesof peace, although by no means unimportant, is to my way of thinkingnot sufficiently important to inflame Europe./ The question whether the possession of the Dardanelles shall beshifted to other owners is entirely different. It constitutes,however, a conjectural eventuality which the present situation doesnot contemplate, I believe, and on which I shall, therefore, expressno opinion. My only concern at present is to give an approximatedefinition, as best I can, of those weighty interests which may leadto another war after the Russian-Turkish war has been actuallyconcluded./
For this reason I deem it important to affirm that thestipulations of peace concerning the Dardanelles mean less for themen-of-war than for the merchant marine. The preëminent Germaninterest in the Orient demands that the waterways, the straits as wellas the Danube from the Black Sea upward, shall continue as free andopen to us as they have been until now. I rather infer that we shallsurely obtain this, for as a matter of fact it has never even beenquestioned. An official communication on this point which I havereceived from St. Petersburg simply refers to the existingstipulations of the treaty of Paris. Nothing is jeopardized; ourposition can be no worse and no better than it has been./ The interest which we have in a better government of a Christiannation and in the safeguards against those acts of violence which haveoccurred at times, under Turkish rule, is taken care of by theagreements mentioned above. And this is the second interest whichGermany has in this whole affair. It is less direct, but is dictatedby humanity./ The rest of the preliminary stipulations consists--I will not say ofphrases, for it is an official paper--but it has no bearing on ourpresent discussion./ With these explanations I have answered to the best of my ability thefirst part of the interpellation concerning the present state ofaffairs in the Orient, and I fear, gentlemen, that I have said nothingnew to any one of you./ The other parts of the question refer to the position which Germanyhas taken or intends to take in view of the now existing conditionsand innovations./ As to the position which we have already taken I cannot now give youany information, for officially we have been in possession of thepapers to which I have referred only a very short while, I may sayliterally only since this very morning. What we knew beforehand was ingeneral agreement with these papers, but not of a nature to makeofficial steps possible. It consisted of private communications forwhich we were indebted to the courtesy of other governments./ Official steps, therefore, have not yet been taken, and would bepremature in view of the conference, which I hope is at hand. All thisinformation will then be available and we shall be in a position toexchange opinions concerning these matters. Any alterations,therefore, of the stipulations of 1856 will have to be sanctioned. Ifthey should not be, the result would not necessarily be another war,but a condition of affairs which all the powers of Europe, I think,have good cause to avoid. /
I am almost tempted to call it making a morass of matters. Let us assumethat no agreement about what has to be done can be reached in theconference, and that the powers who have a chief interest in opposingthe Russian stipulations should say: "At the present moment it does notsuit us to go to war about these questions, but we are not in accord withour agreements, and we reserve our decision"--would not that establisha condition of affairs which cannot be agreeable even to Russia? /
The Russian policy rightly says, "We are not desirous of exposingourselves to the necessity of a Turkish campaign every ten or twentyyears, for it is exhausting, strenuous, and expensive." But the Russian policy, on the other hand, cannot wish to substitutefor this Turkish danger an English-Austrian entanglement recurringevery ten or twenty years. It is, therefore, my opinion that Russia isequally interested with the other powers in reaching an agreementnow, and in not deferring it to some future and perhaps less convenient time./ That Russia could possibly wish to force the other powers by war tosanction the changes which she deems necessary I consider to bebeyond the realm of probability. If she could not obtain the sanctionof the other signers of the clauses of 1856, she would, I suppose, besatisfied with the thought "_Beati possidentes_" (happy are thepossessors). /
Then the question would arise whether those who aredissatisfied with the Russian agreements and have real and materialinterests at stake, would be ready to wage war in order to forceRussia to diminish her demands or to give up some of them. If they should be successful in forcing Russia to give up more than she could bear, they would do so at the risk of leaving in Russia, when thetroops come home, a feeling similar to that in Prussia after thetreaties of 1815, a lingering feeling that matters really are notsettled, and that another attempt will have to be made./
If this could be achieved by a war, one would have to regard, as theaim of this war, the expulsion of Russia from the Bulgarianstrongholds which she is at present occupying, and from her positionwhich no doubt is threatening Constantinople--although she has givenno indication of a wish to occupy this city. Those who would haveaccomplished this by a victorious war, would then have to shoulder theresponsibility of deciding what should be done with these countries ofEuropean Turkey. /
That they should be willing simply to reinstate the Turkish rule in its entiretyafter everything said and determined in the conference, is, I believe, veryimprobable. They would, therefore, be obliged to make some kind of adisposition, which could not differ very much in principle from what is beingproposed now. It might differ in geographical extent and in the degree ofindependence, but I do not believe that Austria-Hungary, for instance, thenearest neighbor, would be ready to accept the entire heritage of the presentRussian conquest, and be responsible for the future of these Slaviccountries, either by incorporating them in the state of Hungary orestablishing them as dependencies. I do not believe that this is anend which Austria can much desire in view of her own Slavic subjects.'
She cannot wish to be the editor of the future in the Balkanpeninsula, as she would have to be if she won a victory./ I mention all these eventualities, in which I place no faith, for thesake of proving how slight the reasonable probability of a Europeanwar appears to be. It is not reasonably probable that the greater orlesser extent of a tributary State--unless conditions were altogetherunbearable--should induce two neighboring and friendly powers to starta destructive European war in cold blood! The blood will be cooler, Iassure you, when we have at last come together in a conference./ It was to meet these eventualities that the idea of a conference wasfirst proposed by the government of Austria-Hungary. We were from thestart ready to accept it, and we were almost the first to do so.Concerning the selection of a place where the conference should beheld, difficulties arose which I consider out of proportion to thesignificance of the whole matter. But even in this direction we haveraised no objections and declared ourselves satisfied with the placeswhich have been mentioned. /
They were Vienna, Brussels, Baden-Baden, Wiesbaden, Wildbad, a place in Switzerland--I should, however, say Wildbad was mentionedby no one but itself. Stuttgart was also mentioned. Any of these places would have been agreeable to us. It now seems--if I am correctly informed,and the decision must be made in a few days--that the choice will fall onBaden-Baden. Our interest, which is shared by those powers with whom we have corresponded, is the despatch of the conference irrespective ofthe choice of a place, which is for us of little consequence./
As regards places in Germany I have expressed no opinion beyond this, that on German soil the presidency would have to be German. This view has nowhere been opposed. After the general acceptance of this principleit will depend on the men sent to attend this conference whether for reasons ofexpediency it must be adhered to. Personally I believe the conferenceis assured, and I expect that it will take place in the first half ofnext March. /
It would be desirable that the conference should takeplace sooner--and the uncertainty concerning it be ended. But before the powers join in a conference, they naturally desire an exchange of opinion the one with the other; and the connections with the seat of war are really very slow. The delay of the communications whichreached us was, and still is, explained by the delay with which newscomes from the seat of war. The suspicion which has for some time beenfelt in the press that this delay was intentional becomes unfoundedwhen one realizes that the advance of the Russian army followingJanuary 30 was in consequence of the stipulations of the armistice,and did not constitute an advantage taken of an opportune moment. /
The boundaries within which the Russian army is stationed today are thelines of demarcation expressly mentioned in the armistice. I do notbelieve in any intentional delay from anywhere; on the contrary, Ihave confidence in the good intentions everywhere to sendrepresentatives to the conference speedily. We certainly shall do ourpart to the best of our ability./ I now come to the most difficult part--excuse me if I continue for thepresent seated--I come to the most difficult part of the task set me,an explanation, so far as this is possible, of the position whichGermany is to take in the conference. In this connection you will notexpect from me anything but general indications of our policy. Itsprogramme Mr. von Bennigsen has developed before you clearly andcomprehensively, almost more so than any strength at the presentmoment permits me to do./ When from many quarters the demand has been made upon us--to be surefrom no government, but only from voices in the press and other wellmeaning advisers--that e should define our policy from the start andforce it on the other governments in some form, I must say that thisseems to me to be newspaper diplomacy rather than the diplomacy of astatesman./ Let me explain to you at once the difficulty and impossibility of sucha course. If we did express a definite programme, which we should beobliged to follow when we had announced it officially and openly notonly before you, but also before the whole of Europe, should we notthen place a premium on the contentiousness of all those whoconsidered our programme to be not favorable to themselves!/ We should also render the part of mediation in the conference, which Ideem very important, almost impossible for ourselves, becauseeverybody with the _menu_ of the German policy in his hand could sayto us: "German mediation can go just so far; it can do this, and thisit cannot do." It is quite possible that the free hand which Germanyhas preserved, and the uncertainty of Germany's decisions have notbeen without influence on the preservation of peace thus far./If you play the German card, laying it on the table, everybody knows how toadapt himself to it or how to avoid it. Such a course is impracticableif you wish to preserve peace. The adjustment of peace does not, Ibelieve, consist in our playing the arbiter, saying: "It must be thus,and the weight of the German empire stands behind it." Peace isbrought about, I think, more modestly. Without straining the similewhich I am quoting from our everyday life, it partakes more of thebehavior of the honest broker, who really wishes to bring about abargain./ As long as we follow this policy we are in the position to save apower which has secret wishes from the embarrassment of meeting with arefusal or an unpleasant reply from its--let me say, congressionalopponent. If we are equally friendly with both, we can first sound oneand then say to the other: "Do not do that, try to arrange matters inthis way." /
These are helps in business which should be highly esteemed. I have anexperience of many years in such matters, and it has been brought home tome often, that when two are alone the thread drops more frequently and is notpicked up because of false shame. The moment when it could be picked uppasses, people separate in silence, and are annoyed. If, however, a third personis present, he can pick up the thread without much ado, and bring the two togetheragain when they have parted. This is the function of which I am thinking andwhich corresponds to the amicable relations in which we are livingwith our friendly neighbors along our extensive borders. /
It is moreover in keeping with the union among the three imperial courtswhich has existed for five years, and the intimacy which we enjoy withEngland, another one of the powers chiefly concerned in this matter.As regards England we are in the fortunate position of not having anyconflicting interests, except perhaps some trade rivalries or passingannoyances. These latter cannot be avoided, but there is absolutelynothing which could drive two industrious and peace-loving nations towar. I happily believe, therefore, that we may be the mediator betweenEngland and Russia, just as I know we are between Austria and Russia,if they should not be able to agree of their own accord./ The three-emperor-pact, if one wishes to call it such, while it isgenerally called a treaty, is not based on any written obligations,and no one of the three emperors can be voted down by the other two.It is based on the personal sympathy among the three rulers, on thepersonal confidence which they have in one another, and on thepersonal relations which for many years have existed among the leadingministers of all three empires./ We have always avoided forming a majority of two against one whenthere was a difference of opinion between Austria and Russia, and wehave never definitely taken the part of one of them, even if our owndesires drew us more strongly in that direction. We have refrainedfrom this for fear that the tie might not be sufficiently strongafter all. /
It surely cannot be so strong that it could induce one ofthese great powers to disregard its own incontestably nationalinterests for the sake of being obliging. That is a sacrifice which nogreat power makes _pour les beaux yeux_ of another. Such a sacrificeit makes only when arguments are replaced by hints of strength. Thenit may happen that the great power will say: "I hate to make thisconcession, but I hate even worse to go to war with so strong a poweras Germany. /
Still I will remember this and make a note of it." That isabout the way in which such things are received. And this leads me tothe necessity of vigorously opposing all exaggerated demands made onGermany's mediation. Let me declare that they are out of the questionso long as I have the honor of being the adviser of His Majesty./ I know that in saying this I am disappointing a great manyexpectations raised in connection with today's disclosures, but I amnot of the opinion that we should go the road of Napoleon and try tobe, if not the arbiter, at least the schoolmaster of Europe./ I have here a clipping given me today from the _Allgemeine Zeitung,_which contains a noteworthy article entitled "The Policy of Germany inthe Decisive Hour." This article demands as necessary the admission ofa third power to the alliance of England and Austria. That means, weshall take part with England and Austria and deprive Russia of thecredit of voluntarily making the concessions which she may be willingto grant in the interest of European peace. /
I do not doubt that Russia will sacrifice for the sake of peace in Europewhatever her sense of nationality and her own interests and those of eightymillion Russians permit. It is really superfluous to say this. And now pleaseassume that we took the advice of the gentlemen who think that we should playthe part of an arbiter--I have here another article from a Berlinpaper, called "Germany's Part as Arbiter"--and that we declared toRussia in some polite and amicable way: '
"We have been friends, it is true, for hundreds of years, Russia has ever been true-blue to us when we were in difficulties, but now things are different. In the interest of Europe, as the policemen of Europe, as a kind of a justiceof the peace, we must do as we are requested, we can no longer resistthe demands of Europe ...," what would be the result?/ There are considerable numbers of Russians who do not love Germany,and who fortunately are not at the helm now, but who would not beunhappy if they were called there. What would they say to theircompatriots, they and perhaps other statesmen who at present are notyet avowedly hostile to us? They would say: "With what sacrifices ofblood and men and money have we not won the position which forcenturies has been the ideal of Russian ambition! /
We could have maintained it against those opponents who may have a real interest in combating it. It was not Austria, with whom we have lived onmoderately intimate terms for some time, it was not England, whopossesses openly acknowledged counter-interests to ours--no, it wasour intimate friend Germany who drew, behind our back, not her swordbut a dagger, although we might have expected from her services inreturn for services rendered, and although she has _no_ interests inthe Orient."/ Those approximately would be the phrases, and this the theme which weshould hear in Russia. This picture which I have drawn in exaggeratedlines--but the Russian orators also exaggerate--corresponds with thetruth. We, however, shall never assume the responsibility ofsacrificing the certain friendship of a great nation, tested throughgenerations, to the momentary temptation of playing the judge inEurope. /To jeopardize the friendship which fortunately binds us to mostEuropean states and at the present moment to all,--for the parties towhom it is an eyesore are not in power,--to jeopardize, I say, thisfriendship with one friend in order to oblige another, when we asGermans have no direct interests, and to buy the peace of others atthe cost of our own, or, to speak with college boys, to substitute ata duel--such things one may do when one risks only one's own life, butI cannot do them when I have to counsel His Majesty the Emperor asregards the policy of a great State of forty million people in theheart of Europe. /
From this tribune I therefore take the liberty of saying a very definite "No" to all such imputations and suggestions. I shall under no condition do anything of the kind; and no government, none of those primarilyinterested, has made any such demands. Germany, as the last speaker remarked, has grown to new responsibilities as it has grownstronger. But even if we are able to throw a large armed force into thescales of European policies, I do not consider anybody justified inadvising the emperor and the princes (who would have to discuss thematter in the Bundesrat if we wished to wage an offensive war) to make an appeal to the proven readiness of the nation to offer bloodand money for a war./
The only war which I am ready to counsel to the emperor is one to protect our independence abroad and our union at home, or to defend those of ourinterests which are so clear that we are supported, if we insist on them, notonly by the unanimous vote of the Bundesrat, which is necessary, butalso by the undivided enthusiasm of the whole German nation.
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